Book review: the great regression edited by Heinrich Geiselberger by Pannini, Elisa
2017-5-15




How do we make sense of the dramatic political changes of recent months? In The Great Regression,
editor Heinrich Geiselberger brings together contributors including Nancy Fraser, Arjun Appadurai and Bruno
Latour to grapple with the causes and consequences of this ostensible ‘great regression’. While questioning the
tendency to centralise ‘the left’ as the prime site of blame, Elisa Pannini praises this cross-national collection for
offering valuable food for thought when it comes to considering the burning political questions of the moment. 
The Great Regression. Heinrich Geiselberger (ed.). Polity. 2017.
Find this book: 
At the end of 2016, after the British vote to leave the European
Union and the US election of President Donald Trump,
academics and pundits have been discussing what was driving
voters to make these controversial choices. The new trends in
politics seem to have in common a refusal of liberal elites and
progressive discourse, opposition to migratory flux and
cosmopolitan identities and a fascination for populist and
uncompromising characters with nationalist and extreme-right
bents.
Coming up with a convincing explanation of this allegedly
transnational phenomenon is not an easy task, and much ink
has already been spilled in the attempt. Last November, one of
the LSE Review of Books sister blogs featured two posts
respectively titled ‘Trump and Brexit: why it’s again NOT the
economy, stupid’ and ‘The Brexit-Trump Syndrome: it’s the
economics, stupid’, highlighting one of the main sources of
disagreement in the debate: what is at the roots of these
events? Is it economic impoverishment and the rage of the
‘losers’ of globalisation? Or is it just a matter of personal values
and identity? The Great Regression is a collection of essays by
distinguished scholars, journalists and writers – including Slavoj
Žižek, Zygmunt Bauman, Nancy Fraser and Bruno Latour – that
tackles these issues.
When I first approached the book, I felt unease at engaging in a
conversation with other members of the global educated class
about what are often considered deplorable and dangerous political views, even though they are widespread
enough in the population to win ballots. As Wolfgang Streeck puts it in Chapter Thirteen, the proclivity to trust
populist leaders is commonly diagnosed by many pundits on the left as a ‘cognitive problem’. However, I was
quickly reassured, because not one of the essays in The Great Regression stigmatises the people who cast their
vote in favour of Brexit or Trump’s presidency. On the contrary, there is a common undertone of reprimand for the
‘globally bourgeoisified left’ – again, the words of Streeck – that failed to foresee and prevent the current social and
economic situation, and that is now struggling to make sense of people’s reaction to this.
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As pointed out by editor Heinrich Geiselberger in the preface, most contributors blame those events on the
neoliberal character of the global world we are living in. Nancy Fraser’s Chapter Four identifies ‘progressive
neoliberalism’ as the cause of the rise of ‘reactionary populism’, but also deems traditional centre-left parties as
guilty of betraying the working classes and flirting with business and finance. Fraser stresses the responsibilities of
politicians like Bill Clinton and Tony Blair during the 1990s in preparing the ground for today’s events, suggesting
that progress on gender, sexual orientation, religion and ethnicity-related issues has been used to ‘gloss over’
economically regressive policies. While the analysis is compelling, the blame is so focused on the left that the reader
would be excused for forgetting how the biggest blows to the welfare state and workers’ rights in the UK and US
came from those Conservative and Republican governments that are again on the rise in this confusing historical
period.
An interesting feature of the book is its cross-national breadth. Not only it is being published simultaneously in
thirteen languages, but its contributors also come from many countries and offer different perspectives and
approaches. Even though all keep referring to Donald Trump and Brexit as the main examples of the phenomenon
they are discussing, some of the authors bring fresh instances by referring to other countries, like Eva Illouz in
Chapter Five on the rise of populist right-wing parties in Israel.
In Chapter One, Arjun Appadurai discusses the transnational phenomenon of fascination for populist authoritarian
leaders by also referencing the successes of Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Viktor
Orbán. He argues that the loss of economic sovereignty of nation-states has produced a shift toward emphasising
cultural sovereignty, which in turn leads to the rise of authoritarian populism. His diagnosis of a ‘democracy fatigue’
pushing democracy to destroy itself may seem at odds with the spread of grassroots movements around the world;
on the other hand, the recent result of the Turkish constitutional referendum seems to rather confirm this self-
destructive trend for democracy. In general, a possible critique of this broad comparative approach is that all the
countries he mentions are facing distinct and peculiar challenges. Turkey, for instance, is involved in complex
international and local conflicts that go beyond the neo-liberalism issue and play a major role in national political
discourse.
The dimension of personal values and identity is not ignored in the book. Even though the economic context is
always considered as being at the root of the problems, some of the essays focus on the dynamics that bring people
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to make decisions based on other considerations than personal economic interest. In Chapter Nine, Pankaj Mishra
highlights a mechanism that potentially explains part of the recent ‘political absurdism’ that sees both the ‘left
behinds’ and richer classes represented by tycoons of questionable morals. He writes about ‘ressentiment, an
existential resentment of other people’s being’, caused by the coexistence in modern societies of formal equality
and everyday experiences of massive differences in power and status. Similarly, in Chapter Eleven, Oliver Nachtwey
discusses feelings of resentment, driven by ‘material and status anxieties’ that lead to a process of ‘decivilisation’
whereby rage and hatred are openly expressed. Again, this phenomenon can be observed across the class
hierarchy.
As a whole, The Great Regression has the merit of providing food for thought on the burning issue of contemporary
political trends. The different perspectives offered by authors from various backgrounds give a wide range of
elements worth considering when trying to understand what is happening to our democracies. Overall, the book
stands by the ‘it’s the economics, stupid’ stance, but also manages to provide interesting considerations on
emerging cultural and identitarian elements. However, it is probably too soon to say how accurate the overall picture
is: any analysis of specific events that aspires at being generalised as a worldwide phenomenon tends to suffer due
to the shortness and proximity of the timespan being considered. The Great Regression is a good read for scholars
and the general public and can be an interesting starting point for one’s own reflections and considerations on recent
political changes. A necessary caveat: it is unlikely that Trump or Brexit enthusiasts will find any pleasure in reading
a book that tries to be objective but, following C. Wright Mills motto, does not claim to be detached.
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